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Science exists to refute dogmas; nevertheless, dogmas may be introduced when
undemonstrated scientific axioms lead us to reject facts incompatible with them. Several
studies have proposed psychobiological interpretations of near-death experiences (NDEs),
claiming that NDEs are a mere byproduct of brain functions gone awry; however,
relevant facts incompatible with the ruling physicalist and reductionist stance have been
often neglected. The awkward transcendent look of NDEs has deep epistemological
implications, which call for: (a) keeping a rigorously neutral position, neither accepting nor
refusing anything a priori; and (b) distinguishing facts from speculations and fallacies. Most
available psychobiological interpretations remain so far speculations to be demonstrated,
while brain disorders and/or drug administration in critical patients yield a well-known
delirium in intensive care and anesthesia, the phenomenology of which is different from
NDEs. Facts can be only true or false, never paranormal. In this sense, they cannot be
refused a priori even when they appear implausible with respect to our current knowledge:
any other stance implies the risk of turning knowledge into dogma and the adopted
paradigm into a sort of theology.
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During the past decade, an increasing number of studies have
focused their attention on the intriguing phenomenon known
as “Near-Death Experiences” (NDEs). NDEs are defined as an
altered state of consciousness that occurs during an episode
of unconsciousness as a result of a life-threatening condition
(Moody, 1975). Under these circumstances, patients often report
perceiving a tunnel, a bright light, deceased relatives, mental clar-
ity, a review of their lives, and out-of-body experiences (OBEs)
in which they describe a feeling of separation from their bodies
and the ability to watch themselves from a different perspective
(for recent reviews, see Holden et al., 2009; Facco, 2010; van
Lommel, 2010; Agrillo, 2011). Most patients describe these expe-
riences as very pleasant, but a few cases may report unpleasant
ones (Greyson and Bush, 1992). It is worth noting that the con-
tent of NDEs is similar worldwide, across cultures and all times
(Belanti et al., 2008). NDEs may occur in people of both gen-
ders and all ages, educational and socioeconomic levels, beliefs,
and life experiences (Bush, 2002), but a prospective study has
reported deeper NDEs in women, in patients having had their
first myocardial infarction, those requiring more resuscitation in
hospital, and those who have had previous NDEs; the same study
reported a lower incidence in the elderly (van Lommel et al.,
2001). The exact incidence is not known: taking into account
the data from both scientific publications and polls of the gen-
eral population, the incidence of NDEs can be roughly estimated
as between 15% and 20% of critical patients, and some 5% of
the general population (Greyson, 1993, 2003; van Lommel et al.,
2001). As suggested by some authors (Schroeter-Kunhardt, 1993;
Facco, 2010; van Lommel, 2011), the incidence of NDEs has prob-
ably increased in the past decades, paralleling the development of
techniques of resuscitation and intensive care, which have allowed
for a progressive improvement of survival and outcome.
The relatively high incidence and clear phenomenology of
NDEs call for scientific explanations of such a complex phe-
nomenon, which appears awkward for its transcendent and some-
times even parapsychological tone. Several neuropsychological
and neurobiological hypotheses have been advanced in the past
two decades within the ruling context of physicalism and scientific
reductionism. Here, we shall shortly outline three items essential
for a proper assessment of NDEs: (a) available scientific inter-
pretations; (b) telling facts from hypotheses; (c) epistemological
aspects and related scientific prejudices.
SCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATIONS
The main hypotheses for NDE interpretations on a scientific basis
are: (a) periphery-to-fovea retinal ischemia as a cause of tun-
nel vision; (b) systemic acidosis and ion shift; (c) temporal lobe
dysfunction and epileptic discharges; (d) glutamate-dependent
excitotoxic damage and its endogenous modulators (such as
agmatine); (e) other neurotransmitter imbalances (including
noradrenaline, dopamine, endogenous opioids, serotonin); (f)
analogies between NDEs and effects of hallucinogens; (g) REM-
sleep intrusions and/or multisensory breakdown involving the
right angular gyrus for (OBEs); (h) psychological hypothesis of
afterlife expectation.
Centripetal ischemia of the retina has been advocated as
the organic cause of tunnel vision, including the observation
of syncopal symptoms of pilots flying at G-force acceleration
(Whinnery and Whinnery, 1990). A visual cortex dysinhibition
associated with anoxia has also been postulated as an explanation
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for tunnel-like perception (Blackmore and Troscianko, 1988;
Blackmore, 1996). High concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2)
and/or hyperkalemia also have been advanced as an explana-
tion for some of the recurring features of NDEs (Meduna,
1950; Klemenc-Ketis et al., 2010). Since endogenous opioids are
released under stress, as during hemorrhagic shock (Molina,
2003), they have been postulated as a possible mechanism for the
positive emotional tone of NDEs. Likewise, the excitotoxic brain
damage yielded by uncontrolled glutamate release in acute brain
lesions led Jansen to speculate its role in NDE origin and consider
ketamine administration as a model for NDEs and OBEs (Jansen,
1989, 1990, 2000).
Britton and Bootzin (2004) investigated temporal lobe func-
tion in patients reporting NDEs and reported a higher rate of
temporal lobe epileptiform discharges in the NDE group in com-
parison to controls, suggesting that a temporal lobe dysfunction
may underlie NDEs; likewise, in a review of autoscopic halluci-
nations due to focal brain damage, a tendency of OBEs toward
a higher rate of right temporal lobe lesions was found (Blanke
and Mohr, 2005). REM-sleep intrusions and sleep paralysis asso-
ciated with hypnagogic and hypnopompic experiences have also
been advocated as causes of NDEs and OBEs (Cheyne et al., 1999;
Nelson et al., 2006); in a retrospective study, a higher rate of these
experiences was reported in subjects with NDE than in controls
(Nelson et al., 2006).
The neurophysiological mechanisms of OBEs have been more
widely investigated and also partially reproduced in the lab-
oratory. Their first interpretation was in terms of autoscopy,
a well-known psychiatric symptom, but the features of OBEs
are entirely different from classical, psychiatric descriptions of
autoscopy (Brugger et al., 1997; Brugger and Mohr, 2009), as
well as from depersonalization disorders. Interestingly, Ehrsson
(2007) induced an illusion of being outside the physical body in
healthy participants by manipulating both visual and tactile per-
ceptions, suggesting that this kind of experience may result from
the combination of visual perspective and other related multi-
sensory information. Even though extensive debate surrounds the
nature of these induced experiences—sometimes considered only
“illusionary experiences” along the lines of bodily illusions, rather
than real “out of body” experiences (Greyson et al., 2009; van
Lommel, 2011)—it seems plausible that such experiences may be
mediated by specific brain regions, where the right angular gyrus
might probably play a primary role (Blanke et al., 2004; Blanke
and Arzy, 2005; De Ridder et al., 2007; Lopez et al., 2008).
Psychological interpretations of NDEs mainly regard the
“expectation hypothesis”: according to it, NDEs would be the
product of altered mental states yielded by life-threatening con-
ditions (Blackmore and Troscianko, 1988; Appleby, 1989; French,
2001; Britton and Bootzin, 2004), which would trigger NDE phe-
nomenology as a projection of beliefs and expectancy of the
afterlife. In this sense, Christians would be likely to see Jesus in
the light, while Muslims might see Allah. Also, atheists are sup-
posed to be tangled in the same cognitive mechanism, with people
projecting their wishes to be rejoined with their own deceased rel-
atives. Other psychological interpretations encompass the mem-
ory of being born, depersonalization, dissociation, personality
factors, fantasies, and imagination (French, 2005; Greyson et al.,
2009; van Lommel, 2010). Very little evidence, however, supports
these latter interpretations.
TELLING FACTS FROM FALLACIES
The above-mentioned studies received a lot of media coverage
because they have undoubtedly provided useful information in
the process of understanding at least some of the recurring fea-
tures of NDEs, but it should be recognized that most if not
all interpretations remain only speculation or, at best, clues of
the possible brain mechanisms triggering them; some of the
results seem questionable or even odd, taking into account other
well-known clinical facts:
• In a sudden severe acute brain damage event such as cardiac
arrest, there is no time for an experience of tunnel vision
from retinal dysfunction, given that the brain is notably much
more sensitive to anoxia and ischemia than peripheral organs;
its role in coma from acute brain lesions (such as trauma or
hemorrhage) is also questionable, as the pathophysiology of
brain damage does not imply retinal ischemia. Fainting due to
arterial hypotension—a common event—does not seem to be
associated with the tunnel visions described in NDEs. In a com-
prehensive review of symptoms and signs of syncope (Wieling
et al., 2009), the prodromal visual changes were described
as blurred and fading vision, scotomas, color changes, dim-
ming or graying of the peripheral field of vision (“graying
out”), followed by peripheral light loss and complete blind-
ness (“blacking out”). Graying out has been clearly described in
experimental conditions only, such as during exposure to cen-
trifugal force. There may be a link between graying out and the
experience of seeing a tunnel, but the latter is qualitatively dif-
ferent and seems to depend on cultural factors as well (Belanti
et al., 2008): in fact, it is usually described as passing through a
tunnel and reaching a new landscape (van Lommel et al., 2001;
Facco, 2010), while graying out is a much simpler transient sen-
sation usually followed by blackout. These data as a wholemake
the retinal hypothesis as the main mechanism of tunnel vision
plausible at best only for pilots and falls from a high altitude in
the mountains.
• Endogenous opioids, which are likely released in critical con-
ditions, are only weak hallucinogens, though they might help
to evoke vivid experiences, particularly when in combination
with cognitive confusion. Nevertheless, NDEs are not reported
by patients using opioids for severe pain, while their cerebral
adverse effects display an entirely different phenomenology in
comparison to NDEs (Mercadante et al., 2004; Vella-Brincat
andMacleod, 2007). Morse also found that NDE occurrence in
children is independent from drug administration, including
opioids (Morse et al., 1986). Therefore, opioids are far from
successful at entirely explaining the positive mood and vivid
“hallucinations” of NDEs.
• The topic of neurotransmitter imbalance and hallucinogens
is very complex and far beyond the limits of this analy-
sis; however, even though some psychedelic drugs such as
DMT and ayahuasca can give rise to quite similar experiences
(Strassman, 2001), aside from providing usable analogies for
NDEs, there are marked differences between the hallucinations
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that accompany use of psychedelic drugs andNDEs, preventing
the latter’s interpretation as a simple byproduct of the release of
specific neurotransmitters (see Facco, 2010, as a review of the
topic). The closest similarity is seen in shamanic or religious
rituals using specific agents, such as the use of iboga in the Bwiti
religion in Gabon (Strubelt and Maas, 2008); anyway, it must
be taken into account that cultural factors such as ritual, per-
sonality, environment, and aims for hallucinogen consumption
are no less relevant than the agent itself with regard to the con-
tent and meaning of the experience, which is largely variable
for any drug.
• Brain lesions, the excitotoxic damage, and the whole of phar-
macologic side effects of therapy (including opioids, steroids,
and anticholinergic agents) may yield a picture of delirium: this
condition is well known in anesthesiology and intensive care,
but both its clinical picture and content of experience differen-
tiate it entirely from NDEs (Facco and Rupolo, 2001; Xie and
Fang, 2009; Frontera, 2011).
• Of the two mentioned studies on the temporal lobe (Britton
and Bootzin, 2004; Blanke andMohr, 2005), one was retrospec-
tive and included cases with focal brain damage only, while in
the other, the control group was made up of participants with-
out any history of life-threatening illness or injury. According
to the scientific principle of isolating the independent variable,
the two compared groups should have been exactly the same
except for the investigated variable (i.e., presence/absence of
NDEs)—that is, patients with life-threatening events should be
comparable to patients reporting NDEs. Therefore, in Britton
and Bootzin’s study (2004), the tendency toward a tempo-
ral lobe dysfunction in patients reporting NDEs, though of
interest, might simply be the result of the injury, without any
cause-effect relationship with NDEs.
• The hypothesis of REM intrusions (Nelson et al., 2006) is not
compatible with cardiac arrest, a condition in which brain elec-
trical activity is silent, though it may remain an interesting
neurophysiological aspect of experiences occurring in non-
critical conditions. Also in the study by Nelson et al. (2006)
the control group was made up of participants without life-
threatening events, thus making any rigorous comparison with
the experimental group impossible. Above all, Greyson et al.
(2009) noted that researchers did not ask whether the REM
intrusion symptoms occurred before or after NDEs. In this
sense, it might be equally possible that NDEs determine sub-
sequent REM intrusions (instead of the latter being the cause
of NDEs).
• The changes in CO2 and kalemia have not been confirmed in
other studies (Parnia et al., 2001), but these two parameters
might be related to NDEs as possible triggers for the events or
for the capability to recall them (Greyson, 2010a). Anyway, it
should be taken into account (as with any other factors) that
even if these two parameters may have a role in triggering
NDEs, the content and meaning of NDEs do not specifically
depend on any substance.
• Neurobiological interpretations of NDEs imply that brain dis-
orders are a sine qua non condition for these experiences,
thus excluding their occurrence in physiological conditions. On
the contrary, near-death-like experiences have been reported
in the absence of cerebral dysfunctions (Owens et al., 1990;
Gabbard and Twemlow, 1991; Facco and Agrillo, under revi-
sion). To that effect, van Lommel (2010) summarized some
of the most frequently recurring circumstances that might
prompt NDEs in the absence of brain function disorders. These
include serious (but not immediately life threatening) condi-
tions, isolation, depression, existential crisis, meditation, and
similar experiences (the so-called “fear-death experiences”).
Another potential circumstance was described by Moody and
Perry (2010), who reported shared death experiences in healthy
people attending the moment of death of a close relative.
These kinds of experiences represent a further challenge to
the above-mentioned reductionistic and mechanistic interpre-
tations, given that they are unrelated to brain disorders.
• Evidence against simple mechanistic interpretations comes also
from a well-known prospective study by van Lommel et al.
(2001), which showed no influence of given medication even
in patients who were in coma for weeks. Factors such as
duration of cardiac arrest (the degree of anoxia), duration of
unconsciousness, intubation, induced cardiac arrest, and the
administered medication were found to be irrelevant in the
occurrence of NDEs. Also, psychological factors did not affect
the occurrence of the phenomenon: for instance, fear of death,
prior knowledge of NDE, and religion were all found to be
irrelevant. Above all, only 12% of patients had a core experi-
ence: if physiological and psychological factors were the cause
of NDE, most of the patients would be expected to report it.
EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS, RELATED SCIENTIFIC
PREJUDICES AND NEGLECTED FACTS
NDEs are an intriguing and relevant phenomenon, the nature of
which is still under debate. Their apparent trascendent tone may
wrongly lead one to take them as clues of an afterlife, glossing over
the neurobiological mechanisms involved in producing them; on
the other hand, a prejudicial refusal of facts that appear trascen-
dent or paranormal might wrongly lead to neglecting them due
to their apparent incompatibility with the widely accepted mate-
rialistic view of the world and known scientific laws. Both these
stances may be harmful sources of opposite errors, the former
leading to belief in non-existing “facts,” the latter to denial of
existing ones. To illustrate this principle, consider that ancient
Chinese astronomers, whose cosmological beliefs did not pre-
clude celestial change, recorded the appearance of new stars much
earlier than Western astronomers who believed in an immutable
heaven (Kuhn, 1970).
The available scientific explanations are very relevant in the
process of understanding NDEs, but they still remain hypotheses,
given the persistent lack of proofs. There is a need for further
efforts undertaken with an open mind and a truly skeptical stance
(that is, neither accepting nor refusing any possibility a priori) to
avoid the risk of putting belief and faith (not just scientific ones)
before facts, with the implicit risk of giving rise to new wrong
beliefs and dogmatic drifts. According to van Lommel (2010),
“true science does not restrict itself to narrow materialistic assump-
tions but is open to new and initially inexplicable findings and
welcome the challenge of finding explanatory theories” (p. 331).
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In a recent prejudicially skeptical review, Mobbs and Watt
(2011) provided a synthetic outline of possible neurobiological
mechanisms of NDEs, concluding that there is nothing paranor-
mal about them. This statement implies a clear-cut incompatibil-
ity between science and parapsychology, which is at least partly
questionable. In fact, parapsychology may be defined as the study
of physical phenomena beyond those presently understandable
(Morris, 2001)—a matter that in itself does not imply any incom-
patibility with science and its methodologies. Instead, it only
tracks the border between what is actually known/understandable
and what is still to be understood/redefined, while facts by them-
selves can only be true or false, not paranormal. The same goes for
religious visions, mentioned in the Mobbs andWatt (2011) paper
in terms of delusions or hallucinations only, in order to justify a
dysfunctional origin of NDEs’ transcendent components. Brain
disorders may yield religious delusions, but taking into account
only delusions without considering the possibility of true and
meaningful religious experiences (with their deep psychological,
philosophical, and cultural implications) may be misleading, like
a false syllogism.
In the tricky inductive process that aims at understanding
new phenomena, two main steps can be recognized: (a) explain-
ing them on the basis of what is known; (b) discovering new
laws that allow for explanations. The former is the simpler
approach, and the first recourse; the second is much more dif-
ficult and is entered when available explanations are not able to
fit facts. During this tricky phase, unavoidably spurious argu-
ments are often introduced in attempts to explain new facts with
old theories; instead, one should welcome evidence that is able
to falsify given theories, in order to test the viability of such
evidence (Popper, 1963). Such a problem occurred in the pro-
cess of arriving at a definition of brain death over a period of
some 20 years, from the 1960s to 1980s (see Facco, 2001, for
further details). This might also be the case for NDEs, the avail-
able scientific interpretations of which are far from fitting NDE
phenomenology.
As already discussed, the idea that NDEs are the mere results
of a brain function gone awry looks to rely more on specula-
tion than facts (Mobbs and Watt, 2011) and suffers from bias in
skipping both the facts and hypotheses that challenge the reduc-
tionist approach (e.g., see van Lommel, 2004, 2011; Facco, 2010;
Greyson, 2010b; Agrillo, 2011). Simple advocated physical causes,
such as anoxia/ischemia, explain very well the common experi-
ence of fainting, but are far from explaining the nature of NDEs
or why NDEs occur in only a minority of cases, as already empha-
sized by van Lommel et al. (2001). Furthermore, complete brain
anoxia with absent electrical activity in cardiac arrest is incom-
patible with any form of consciousness, according to present
scientific knowledge, making the finding of an explanation for
NDEs a challenging task for the ruling physicalist and reduction-
ist view of biomedicine (Kelly et al., 2007; Greyson, 2010b; van
Lommel, 2010). In order to safeguard the accepted axioms, odd
comments have sometimes also been reported. For instance, in
order to justify the occurrence of NDEs, Bardy (2002) questioned
whether in cardiac arrest with flat EEG brain electrical activity
is really silent; however, it is well known that this is not the case
(Parnia and Fenwick, 2002).
There is increasing evidence that consciousness is mediated
by a large-scale coherence in the gamma band, binding dif-
ferent cortical areas, and recurrent activity between the cortex
and thalamocortical loops, with perceptual periods in the order
of 80–100msec (Singer, 1998, 2001; Zeman, 2001; John, 2002;
Melloni et al., 2007). Anesthesia can suppress consciousness by
simply interrupting binding and integration between local brain
areas without the need for suppressing EEG activity (Alkire and
Miller, 2005; Alkire et al., 2008). This is the reason why, in clin-
ical practice, general anesthesia can be associated with almost
normal EEG with peak activity in the alpha band (Facco et al.,
1992), while in deep, irreversible coma, consciousness can be
lost even with a preserved alpha pattern activity (Facco, 1999;
Kaplan et al., 1999). In short, loss of consciousness can occur
with preserved EEG activity, while, in the case of a flat EEG, nei-
ther cortical activity nor binding can occur; furthermore, short
latency somatosensory-evoked potentials, which explore the con-
duction through brain stem up to the sensory cortex and aremore
resistant to ischemia than EEG, have been reported to disappear
during cardiac arrest (Yang et al., 1997). The whole of these data
clearly disproves any speculation about residual undetected brain
activity as a cause for some conscious experience during cardiac
arrest.
A few well-witnessed cases of NDEs suggest the possibility
of a partial dissociation between body and mind (Sabom, 1998;
van Lommel et al., 2001; van Lommel, 2011): they sound odd
and hardly compatible with our present knowledge, but might
be a clue of possible, still unknown properties of consciousness.
Even the oddest facts, if true, should not be neglected but rather
received with an open mind and investigated for the sake of
coherence with the essence of scientific knowledge.
Finally, the data available in the literature are not easily com-
patible with the interpretation of “meeting deceased people” as a
mere consequence of the psychological hypothesis of expectation,
considering that in most cases the perception of undefined enti-
ties (not belonging to the iconography of the patients’ religion)
and figures other than known deceased persons has been reported
(see, for instance, Holden et al., 2009; van Lommel, 2010).
Moreover, it is unclear how people in sudden critical condi-
tions (such as cardiac arrest) might be aware of being near-death
and have time enough to develop complex scenarios according
to their wishes. Also the occurrence of NDEs in children, even
as young as three year old (Morse et al., 1985, 1986), does not
support an expectation hypothesis, given their lack of a clear
vision of death and of elaborate philosophical-religious views
of life.
The neurobiological correlations between NDEs, the parieto-
temporo-occipital junction (see Lopez et al., 2008, as a review of
the topic), the limbic system (Blackmore, 1996), and the tempo-
ral lobe (Britton and Bootzin, 2004) are relevant; however, it is
widely known that statistical correlations of mental and biolog-
ical processes do not imply that the former totally derive from
the latter and do not prove any cause-effect relationship between
the two. Exactly as our legs are the substrate or correlate of walk-
ing, neural networks are necessary for mental phenomena, but
this does not imply we decide to run because of legs (Bunge,
2010). Even assuming a casual relation, which is not the case,
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abnormal activity in the temporal lobe or other locations might
be sufficient for the occurrence of some features of NDEs, but
concluding that such pattern activities are necessary for NDEs
is another thing, not yet demonstrated. In this regard, Britton
and Bootzin (2004) in the above-mentioned study on NDEs
and the temporal lobe correctly admitted that the differences
observed between NDEs and the control group were probably
the generalized result of trauma rather than specific to NDEs.
Last but not least, Mobbs and Watt (2011) provided an appeal-
ing analogy between NDEs and some mental disorders, such
as the Cotard syndrome. Nevertheless, from a phenomenolog-
ical point of view, the Cotard syndrome looks to be just the
opposite of NDEs: the former is a delusion of being dead when
alive, while the latter is the awareness of being conscious and
alive when clinically dead (i.e., in cardiac arrest with flat EEG).
Such an analogy is not acceptable and, anyway, analogy does not
imply identity; even assuming an identity of the kind of expe-
rience, both its meaning and pathophysiology might be totally
different.
In conclusion, NDEs are an intriguing and still misunderstood
phenomenon, challenging the heart of neurobiological axioms
(i.e., the idea of consciousness as an epiphenomenon of brain
circuitry). In this regard we should keep in mind that the study
of consciousness has been a priori rejected by Galilean sciences
and relegated to philosophy and religion for centuries: this was
not the result of a free and well-founded epistemological reflec-
tion but a byproduct of the conflict with the Inquisition, being
that the soul (that is, psyche and mind) was an exclusive matter of
theology. As a result, the study of consciousness has become one
of the main topics of neuroscience only in recent years and is still
in its very beginning stages; we probably know much less about
the mind than we are inclined to believe, despite the wealth of
valuable data on neuroimaging of brain functions. Even worse is
our knowledge of spirituality and other still misunderstood mind
activities (the so-called altered states of consciousness), includ-
ing NDEs, hypnosis, meditation, and mystic experiences (Vaitl
et al., 2005). As far as spirituality is concerned, its very name is
a source of mistrust in the world of materialistic science (due to
the above-mentioned historical reasons): here, it is only worth
emphasizing that spirituality is a faculty of the mind, and, as
such, it is independent from any theological or doctrinal view and
can be scientifically studied [see the outstanding recent books by
Kelly et al. (2007) and Walach et al. (2011)]. It is now time to
remove the ongoing cultural filters and include consciousness,
spirituality, and the highest mind expressions in neuroscience
in a free, secular, and scientific perspective to overcome old
prejudices.
The value of neurobiological and reductionist approaches is
not discussed here, but only their possible wrong use (i.e., when
their assumptions are taken for absolute, unchanging truths, like-
wise the dogmas of theology and catechism). In fact, the essential
virtue of modern science is twofold: (a) the capability to gain
systematic knowledge of the physical world through observation,
experimentation and a critical process of falsification; (b) the
capability of reforming its own theories and even axioms and
language, when the accepted model of reality turns out to be
incompatible with facts, leading to the “paradigm shifts” claimed
by Kuhn (1970). Such a dramatic shift occurred in the twenti-
eth century, when relativistic and quantum physics overturned
classical thought.
Reductionism is a good and powerful tool we should make
a good use of, but it is only a tool, like a knife, which can
be used for both saving a life or killing a man. The reduc-
tionist approach is essential for studying areas of the brain and
mechanisms involved in specific functions, but it looks to be
blind to the phenomenality of experiences, meanings, values,
and their impact on human life and culture, which remain on
the dark side of the reductionistic moon. Here it is only worth
mentioning how the relationship between mind and brain, the
so-called “hard problem,” is still an unsolved problem (Chalmers,
1995, 1999; Rudrauf et al., 2003; Ibanez, 2007). The whole of
data here reported indicates an increasing need for a broader
scientific approach to consciousness and other non-ordinary
activities of mind, including those belonging to the suspicious
areas of transcendence and spirituality, with their still misun-
derstood physiology. This might be the case with NDEs as
well, where taking a priori the content of such awkward expe-
riences as exclusive expression of brain pathology and worth-
less epiphenomena of brain circuitry might lead to misleading
results.
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